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Avi-Yonah:

DO LAWYERS NEED ECONOMISTS?
Review of Katja Langenbucher, Economic Transplants: On Lawmaking for Corporations and
Capital Markets (Cambridge U. Press, 2017)
Reuven Avi-Yonah
The University of Michigan

Katja Langenbucher’s outstanding book seeks to address the question of why and in what ways
have lawyers been importing economic theories into a legal environment, and how has this
shaped scholarly research, judicial and legislative work? Since the financial crisis, corporate or
capital markets law has been the focus of attention by academia and media. Formal modelling
has been used to describe how capital markets work and, later, has been criticized for its
abstract assumptions. Empirical legal studies and regulatory impact assessments offered
different ways forward. This excellent book presents a new approach to the risks and benefits
of interdisciplinary policy work. The benefits economic theory brings for reliable and tested
lawmaking are contrasted with important challenges including the significant differences of
research methodology, leading to misunderstandings and problems of efficient implementation
of economic theory's findings into the legal world. Katja Langenbucher's innovative research
scrutinizes the potential of economic theory to European legislators faced with a lack of
democratic accountability.
I would like to address the question whether economic theory and modeling are useful for
lawyers by focusing on another field, tax law, where economists have been very influential.
Many US law schools now have economists with no law degree teaching tax law, and several of
the leading younger tax law professors at top schools have economics PhDs as well as JDs.
However, I have some doubts whether economic theory is really useful for tax law (as opposed
to empirical research, where lawyers can learn from econometric analyses of data). Let me give
one example. The US until 2017 has always taxed US persons (both corporations and
individuals) on their worldwide income “from whatever source derived”, as permitted by the US
Constitution (Amendment XVI), because that was the best measure of ability to pay. But a
problem arose in the 1930s because rich US individuals would transfer their foreign source
income to “incorporated pocketbooks”, i.e., shell corporations that they controlled in tax
havens. For example, Colonel Jacob Schick, who invented the electric razor in the army,
transferred his patent to a shell in the Bahamas, then gave up his US citizenship in 1935 and
moved to Canada to live out his retirement (he died in 1937).
Congress responded by enacting the “foreign personal holding corporation” regime that taxed
individual US shareholders in foreign corporations they controlled if over 60% of the
corporations’ income was passive (dividends, interest, capital gains or royalties). There was no
economic theory involved: It was a pure question of fairness, since it was considered unfair for
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rich people not to pay tax on such mobile income while domestic wage earners were taxed at
rates as high as 94%.
In the 1960s, the Kennedy Administration decided to apply a similar regime to the income of
foreign corporations controlled by US corporate parents- i.e., to “controlled foreign
corporations” or CFCs. However, this time the rationale given was not fairness (despite the
unfairness of taxing domestic corporations but not CFCs) but rather “capital export neutrality”
(CEN), an economic theory invented by Peggy Musgrave in the 1950s. Stanley Surrey, who was
the first Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, liked working with economists and
was a close friend of Richard Musgrave, his Harvard colleague and Peggy’s husband. Surrey
decided invoking CEN was a more “scientific” justification than fairness, although in general he
cared deeply about fairness in the tax code.1
CEN stood for the idea that it is inefficient not to tax CFCs because that violated “export
neutrality” by creating an incentive to invest overseas rather than in the US.2 Until the 1990s, it
was the guiding principle of US international taxation.3 But in the 1990s, the multinationals
wanted to reduce their taxes on foreign source income, and they got the economists to come
up with a counter theory, capital ownership neutrality (CON), which argued that it is inefficient
to impose tax on foreign source income of US CFCs if foreign countries do not do the same.4 As
Willard Taylor (a very experienced tax lawyer) has argued, CON is just a fancy name for
competitiveness.5 But CON was successful in giving cover to Congress to ultimately (in 2017)
abolish the tax on CFCs even when their income was repatriated to their US parents- a blatant
deviation from the “from whatever source derived” rule.
In my opinion, the ultimate blame rests on Surrey, because it was completely unnecessary to
bring the economic concepts into play- the tax on CFCs could be fully justified on fairness
grounds. It is unfair to tax a domestic corporation in full and a US corporation operating
1

On Surrey and horizontal equity see Avi-Yonah, Reuven S. and Fishbien, Nir and Mazzoni, Gianluca, Stanley
Surrey, the Code and the Regime (July 4, 2019). U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 652. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3414965 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3414965.
2
STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 90TH CONG., 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF H.R. 10650, 87TH
CONG., THE REVENUE ACT OF 1962, at 126 (Comm. Print 1967) (Statement by Hon. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the
Treasury, Before the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, on the President’s Message
on Taxation, May 3, 1961): “Either we tax the foreign income of U.S. companies at U.S. tax rates and credit income
taxes paid abroad, thereby eliminating the tax factor in the U.S. investor’s choice between domestic and foreign
investment; or we permit foreign income to be taxed at the rates applicable abroad, thereby removing the impact,
if any, which tax rate differences may have on the competitive position of the American investor abroad. Both
types of neutrality cannot be achieved at once. I believe that reasons of tax equity as well as reasons of economic
policy clearly dictate that in the case of investment in other industrialized countries we should give priority to tax
neutrality in the choice between investment here and investment abroad.”
3
The Deferral of Income Earned Through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations: A Policy Study, Office of Tax Policy,
Department of the Treasury (December 2000).
4
Desai, Mihir A. and Hines, James R. Jr. (2003), Evaluating International Tax Reform, National Tax Journal, 56:3,
pp. 487-502.
5
Willard Taylor, What’s ‘Neutral’ About This? Tax Notes Int’l, May 30, 2011, p. 715.
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through a CFC at zero. It is also dangerous not to tax income of CFCs because of the
opportunities to shift income to them from the US, as clearly evidenced by the $3 trillion
amassed by US multinationals in low-tax jurisdictions between 2005 and 2017.
But there is light at the end of the tunnel: As Langenbucher also shows, after the financial crisis,
the influence of economic modes in law has diminished. In addition, many contemporary
economists follow the lead of Thomas Piketty in advocating higher taxes on the rich and on
large corporations.1 I would, however, argue that lawyers need to be careful before relying
even on these economic models, because they do not want to follow Surrey in granting too
much power to the economists.

11

See, e.g., Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, The Triumph of Injustice: How the Rich Dodge Taxes and How to
Make Them Pay (2019).
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